Regional incentives and patient cross-border mobility: 

evidence from the Italian experience by Brenna, Elenka & Spandonaro, Federico
Regional incentives and patient cross-border mobility: 
evidence from the Italian experience
Elenka Brenna1*, Federico Spandonaro2
Abstract
Background:  In recent years, accreditation of private hospitals followed by decentralisation of the Italian National 
Health Service (NHS) into 21 regional health systems has provided a good empirical ground for investigating 
the Tiebout principle of “voting with their feet”. We examine the infra-regional trade-off between greater patient 
choice (due to an increase in hospital services supply) and financial equilibrium, and we relate it to the significant 
phenomenon of Cross-Border Mobility (CBM) between Italian regions. Focusing on the rules supervising the 
financial agreements between regional authorities and providers of hospital care, we find incentives for private 
accredited providers in attracting patient inflows.
Methods: The analysis is undertaken from an institutional, regulatory and empirical perspective. We select a sample 
of five regions with higher positive CBM balance and we examine regional regulations governing the contractual 
agreements between purchasers and providers of hospital care. According to this sample, we provide a statistical 
analysis of CBM and apply a Regional Attraction Ability Index (RAAI), aimed at testing patient preferences for 
private/public accredited providers.
Results: We find that this index is systematically higher for private providers, both in the case of distance/boundary 
patients and of  excellence/general hospitals. 
Conclusion: Conclusions address both financial issues regarding the coverage of regional healthcare systems and 
equity issues on patient healthcare access. They also raise concerns on the new European Union (EU) directive 
inherent to patient mobility across Europe.
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Implications for policy makers
• Inter-regional mobility for hospital care is a relevant issue for both equity reasons (high costs of care access for distant patients) and financial 
reasons (resource reallocation among regions).
• In Italy, this phenomenon involves relevant flows of patients and money moving from the southern regions to selected northern and central 
regions.
• The accreditation of private hospitals and the rules governing the financial coverage of hospital admissions in each region are key factors for 
explaining patients’ mobility.
• Mutual agreements between regions which respectively manage patients’ in and out flows may help in controlling the Cross-Border Mobility 
(CBM) phenomenon. 
• The Italian experience raises concerns on patients’ mobility across Europe after the implementation of the Directive 2011/24/EU.
Implications for public
In the Italian decentralised National Health Service (NHS), every year consistent flows of patients migrate from one region to another causing a 
considerable financial impact on regional budgets. This phenomenon follows a north-south gradient with most of the central and northern well-
endowed healthcare systems attracting patients from southern Italy, where the services do not cover such a broad range of hospital specializations 
and/or do not guarantee the same perceived quality of care. We want to test whether, beside the well-known determinants of patients’ Cross-Border 
Mobility (CBM), there is an induction effect, which applies to the accredited private providers (more trained in recruiting patients via marketing 
activity) and is encouraged by the regional rules on the financial coverage of  hospital admissions. The analysis – performed at institutional, normative 
and statistical level – gives evidence of an induction effect.
Key Messages 
Introduction 
In Italy, hospital accreditation – either in the private or 
public sector – has been carried out with the objective of 
implementing competition mechanisms among providers, 
improving the quality of care and containing the health 
expenditure. Patient free choice is the appropriate tool for 
enhancing these goals. However, as different authors suggest, 
competition does not necessarily lead to positive effects in the 
healthcare sector as results depend to a considerable extent 
upon the rules of the system (1–4). In Italy, the “rules of the 
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system” are the following: the National Health Service (NHS) 
is set on a federal model where each region is responsible 
for the organisation and funding of the local health system. 
Patients do not have to pay for hospital treatments and 
can choose their healthcare providers according to their 
preferences, inside or outside their region of residence. 
However, if they choose a private provider, this has to be 
accredited by the health system of the region in which it is 
established in order to be free of charge. The accreditation 
process in Italy has been implemented without a uniform 
design: some regions, mostly the ones located in northern or 
central Italy, have accredited (among others) well-provided 
hospitals, whereas very few southern regions (including 
Molise) did the same (5,6). As a consequence, there is a 
consistent annual flow of patients migrating from southern 
regions towards central-northern ones in search of hospital 
admissions: this phenomenon is significant, since 34.2% of 
total Cross-Border Mobility (CBM) moves in this direction, 
causing a considerable financial impact on regional budgets 
(6–10). We aim to investigate whether the regional rules 
governing financial coverage of hospital admissions might 
have been used as an incentive to private providers in order 
to attract patients from other regions. Private accredited 
hospitals are more used to marketing initiatives in order to 
attract patients, compared to public hospitals: while the risk 
of bailing out for the former is real, public hospitals have 
benefited from ex-post refunding by regions for many years. 
Therefore, in the case of excess production, patient inflows 
could represent a valid source of revenue for private providers.
From the demand side (according to most authors), the main 
determinants of patient choice in opting for a determined 
hospital are perceived quality of services (influenced by the 
availability of information on hospital performance), distance 
from the hospital and waiting times (11–13). Gravity models 
are frequently used to explain patient mobility across regions 
or Health Districts (HD). In very general terms, a patient 
will choose a hospital in region A, with respect to a hospital 
in region B where he lives, if the cost of moving offsets the 
difference in quality between the two hospitals. To this 
extent, of course, the availability of services in both regions 
is an important variable to be considered (14). The higher the 
difference in quality between region A and region B and the 
lower the travel costs, the higher the probability of observing a 
migration between A and B (11). There is a range of variables 
employed in gravity models to explain patient mobility across 
regions or HD, including population density at HD origin/
destination, per capita income at HD origin/destination, 
technology index at HD origin/destination and availability of 
at least a Hospital Trust in the HD of destination, in order 
to indicate the presence of a well-provided hospital able to 
attract patient inflows (13). With regard to the previous issue, 
hospital accreditation policies between 1992 and 1999 – 
including the choice of accrediting well-provided hospitals –
have been autonomously implemented by each region within 
the context of the Italian federal setting.
We want to test whether, besides the well-known determinants 
of patient CBM, there is an induction effect that applies to 
accredited private providers and is encouraged by the internal 
rules of selected regions attracting consistent patient inflows1. 
Reliable CBM flows may prove beneficial at a regional level for 
different reasons, such as absorbing any excess production in 
the hospital sector, balancing the regional healthcare budget 
(10), increasing the use of local services (accommodations, 
restaurant and tourist facilities) and improving the perception 
of quality within a region, which means a good electoral 
feedback for regional authorities. We focus on the possible 
strategic incentives applied to accredited private providers at 
regional level in order to attract CBM flows. Some northern 
and central regions might have accredited new providers 
not only to meet region-wide hospital care requirements, 
but also with the aim of attracting patient inflows from 
other regions (particularly from southern Italy), where 
hospitals do not cover such a broad range of  treatments and/
or do not guarantee the same perceived quality of care. The 
geographical factor is significant in this context. In 2011, 
southern regions reported a negative balance amounting to 
€-1.046 billion for CBM, while northern regions reported 
a surplus of €863 million (9). Within this framework, the 
“money follows the patient” principle is strictly complied 
with. The result is that southern regions pay for both their 
internal inefficiencies (hospitals not reaching economies 
of scale) and their patients’ escape (for whom they have to 
pay the entire cost of treatment); whereas northern regions 
benefit from good quality hospital systems that meet 
economies of scale, facing a small degree of outflows due to 
passive mobility – therefore balancing their budgets. Actually, 
patient mobility is somehow unavoidable since, when dealing 
with very rare treatments, it is efficient to concentrate the 
supply in few hospital centres (15). Apart from these cases, we 
consider the patient’s decision to move to another region as 
both a manifestation of his/her dissatisfaction with the local 
healthcare supply (13) and successful marketing initiatives by 
private providers in the region of destination. We consider 
accreditation – and especially the rules supervising financial 
agreements between regional authorities and providers of 
hospital care – as a possible determinant factor for CBM in 
the Italian NHS. 
Patient mobility is not a phenomenon that is limited to the 
Italian case. Evidence exists regarding CBM within the NHS 
in the UK (16) and also in the Spanish decentralised health 
service (12). Actually, most of the recent literature on patient 
mobility relates to international mobility between countries, 
in some cases even labelled as “medical tourism”. This 
increasing phenomenon has been studied under different 
perspectives – flow size, internal domestic regulations, 
reciprocity agreements between countries, patient profiles 
and equity concerns – but further research on this topic is 
still needed (14,17–20). However these issues – despite a 
possible parallelism with Italian inter-regional mobility – go 
beyond the scope of this study: namely the relation between 
accreditation policies at the regional level and the CBM 
phenomenon.
The Italian case is appealing from a policy perspective due to 
the decentralisation of its NHS in 21 different regional health 
systems which, together with patient free choice, offers a good 
empirical ground for investigating the Tiebout principle of 
“voting with their feet” (21). The analysis is undertaken from 
an institutional, regulatory and empirical perspective. With 
this in mind, we have selected a sample of regions deemed 
significant in terms of positive CBM balance (see Figure 1) 
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and representative of different regional healthcare models. 
The selected regions are Lombardy (quasi market model) and 
Emilia Romagna (integrated model) in the North, Tuscany 
(prevalence of public beds) and Lazio (prevalence of private 
beds) in the Centre, and Molise – the only southern region 
showing a positive balance for hospital CBM – in the South 
(5,22). The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Institutional background section presents the institutional 
framework governing provision of hospital services in Italy’s 
NHS; The next section analyses the normative framework 
regulating the hospital accreditation process both at a national 
and at a regional level, as well as contractual agreements 
between purchasers and providers of hospital care services; 
Methods section describes the relevant data and the statistical 
analysis; Discussion section summarises the main findings; 
while Conclusions section address a few policy proposals 
suitable for regulating the CBM phenomenon in the hospital 
sector that involves nearly 810,000 patients on a yearly 
basis (8,9).
Institutional background
The reform of the Italian NHS, which started in 1992 and was 
finalized in 1999, introduced competition principles among 
providers with the twofold objective of increasing the quality 
of care and containing the healthcare expenditure (23–25). 
The main features of the theoretical model are the separation 
between purchaser and provider, with competing providers, 
centrally set prospective prices [Diagnosis-Related Group 
(DRG) tariffs], the provision of greater and more accessible 
information on quality and the encouragement of entry, 
mainly from the private sector. 
Subsequent to the reform, the hospital sector underwent a 
radical change: many private providers were accredited and, 
similarly to public hospitals, they were granted public funds 
for hospital activities delivered within the NHS scheme. In 
Italy, patients are provided with hospital treatment completely 
free of charge. Each region, through its Local Health 
Authorities (LHAs), is financially responsible for the health 
services delivered to its resident population. Accredited 
private hospitals have the option of treating patients within 
the NHS scheme (i.e. free of charge) and be reimbursed by 
the LHA that the patient belongs to (13). Healthcare funds are 
distributed by the regions to the LHAs based upon (possibly 
adjusted) capitation arrangements. At the beginning of the 
year, each LHA allocates a share of its budget for hospital 
Figure 1. CBM balance for acute admissions (ordinary and DH) – year 
2011. Source: Elaboration of data from the Ministry of Health (MoH).
activity: hospital treatments can be provided by independent 
public hospitals (i.e. Hospital Trusts, bearing full responsibility 
for their own budgets), accredited private hospitals, or public 
hospitals directly managed by the LHA. With the first two 
categories of providers, the purchaser (LHA) contracts 
the number and typology of admissions as well as the 
restrictions (overall ceiling, tariff caps and cuts) in case of 
excess production. Admissions are paid on a DRG scheme. 
If hospital treatments are sold to non-enrolled persons, LHAs 
receive additional resources for the treatments they export. 
Similarly, LHAs paying for the treatments they import (i.e. for 
the admission of their patients in a hospital which is not in 
their territory) will suffer from financial outflows (13).
This framework can be transposed on a larger scale at an 
inter-regional level, where sizeable financial flows subsidize 
patient mobility across regions. Italy implemented its fiscal 
federalism in 2000. Each region, through its internal taxation, 
raises the funds needed to finance its healthcare sector. In 
compliance with the patient free choice principle, individuals 
are allowed to choose the provider of their hospital care 
without any geographical constraint, whether inside or 
outside their region of residence. In the latter case, however, 
this gives rise to a financial transaction respectively between 
regions of residence and destination, through a conventional 
flat rate Tariffa Unica Convenzionale (TUC). TUC is DRG-
specific and henceforth includes the full cost (running 
and fixed2) for treatment: since tariffs related to the same 
treatment (e.g. tonsillectomy) may vary between regions, the 
TUC is a “mean of regional DRGs” due to a specific treatment. 
To this extent, regions experiencing high patient outflows 
end up paying for both the hospital treatment supplied to 
their outgoing patients and the fixed costs of their public 
hospitals that cannot work efficiently due to a low demand 
for admissions. From a financial standpoint, each region 
has a strong incentive to limit its outflow of patients and to 
attract inflows of patients from other regions. In a federal 
setting, as is the case in Italy, it becomes crucial to find out 
whether the regions showing high patient inflows developed 
their accreditation process primarily to meet their internal 
care requirements, or essentially with the indirect objective of 
attracting CBM. Most of the regions showing a positive CBM 
balance transformed their deficits into net gains through 
CBM revenues (10).
This analysis focuses on admissions in acute care, which 
represent almost 80% of the entire CBM phenomenon in 
terms of volume and financial flow. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate a 
clear geographical factor, with the southern regions showing 
high escape values and most of the northern and central 
regions presenting marked attraction values. When observing 
the longitudinal CBM balance data (2000-2005-2010), the 
stability of the trend suggests the presence of a structural 
misallocation of resources in the Italian NHS (Figure 3). 
The accreditation process between centrally set rules and 
regional regulations
In Italy, the hospital accreditation process began in 1992 with 
Decree no. 502/92, which established the qualitative standards 
of providers in order to implement a new healthcare system 
where public and private hospitals would compete for the 
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increase, health expenditure control and a better quality of 
care. After a few years of minor changes in the regulations, 
the reform was finalized in 1999 (Decree no. 229/99), with 
the definition of a four-step accreditation process. This 
procedure, also called the “four A” system, is organized as 
follows: 1) authorization to build the hospital facility; 2) 
authorization to carry out healthcare activities; 3) institutional 
accreditation; 4) contractual agreements. While the first 
two steps are mostly related to technical aspects, the other 
two quite closely reflect the health policy approach of each 
region and, therefore, require some comments. Institutional 
accreditation is the stage that gives the provider permission to 
work for the Italian NHS, and it is only granted subsequent to 
prior authorization by the region, consistently with internal 
hospital care needs and resource planning. This step has been 
performed autonomously at a regional level, without central 
supervision guaranteeing an equitable allocation of hospital 
services among regions. Some regional health systems have 
accredited well-provided hospitals, while others have not, 
and this picture follows a north-south gradient. The reason 
for this heterogeneity can possibly be found in the “two-
speed” regionalisation process that applies to the Italian 
case [see for example (26)]. From the nineties on, in view of 
an imminent decentralisation, several northern and some 
central regions worked on reinforcing their own healthcare 
systems, while most of the southern regions did not have a 
clear plan on how to develop their health service supply (5). 
The Italian north-south gradient is deeply rooted in historical 
cultural and political factors: although steps have been taken 
towards filling many gaps over the last decade, differences still 
remain and the regional autonomy shown in several northern 
Figure 2. Attraction and escape regional index – acute admissions 
(ordinary and DH) – year 2011. Source: Elaboration of data from the 
MoH. * Escape and attraction indeces are expressed in percentage values.
Figure 3. Trend of CBM balance – years 2000, 2005, 2010. Source: 
Elaboration of data from the MoH.
healthcare systems is still far from being achieved in the 
southern regions. 
The final step – the contractual agreement – is the tool 
that grants public funds to accredited private hospitals: 
without this agreement, a private provider can still admit 
NHS patients, but only on a “private funding” basis. At 
the beginning of the year, every LHA charts out, through 
a contractual agreement with each provider, the type and 
maximum number of admissions (overall ceilings), as well 
as the financial restrictions applied (tariff caps or cuts). In 
general terms – and this is a very important issue for our 
analysis – it is more likely for private providers to comply with 
these restrictions: when public providers exceed their upper 
production limit, they are actually refunded ex-post by the 
region for any budget loss. Fortunately, in recent years, the 
risk of bailing out by public providers has been kept under 
control and in many regions public providers comply to 
ceilings and targets. However, when it applies, this condition 
raises an important equity question because it represents 
additional funding for public health centres that is denied 
to private hospitals (27–29). This consideration led us to a 
closer investigation, within the selected sample of regions, of 
the regulations governing contractual agreements: evidence 
shows that a more extensive entrepreneurial autonomy is 
granted to accredited private hospitals, which often balance 
their budget by drawing resources from CBM flows. The 
regional legislation of all regions included in the sample, 
with the exception of Molise3, shows that LHAs and regions 
determine with private providers the maximum number of 
admissions (ceilings) just for resident patients, contextually 
excluding cross-border patients from any kind of restriction. 
For example, this is the case for Lombardy and Emilia 
Romagna, where the financing of CBM admissions is paid 
extra-budget at the end of the year. In the General Agreement 
between the Emilia Romagna Region and Italian Association 
of Private Accredited Hospitals (AIOP) we found that: “The 
payment of the cross-border admissions is not accounted 
for in the budget, nor is the access of non-resident patients 
subject to restrictions by the LHAs of Emilia Romagna...”. 
This condition implicitly recognises diverse entrepreneurial 
authority to private providers, who are regulated by a different 
contractual scheme compared to public providers. Based on 
this mechanism, a production excess by accredited private 
providers can relapse financially on patient inflows.
Methods
Analysis of Cross-Border Mobility (CBM) flows
The empirical analysis focuses on CBM acute admissions 
for the five regions included in the sample: Lombardy, 
Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Lazio and Molise. We only take 
publicly financed admissions into consideration, i.e. CBM 
patients hospitalised in public and private hospitals under the 
NHS scheme. The data, updated to 2010, has been directly 
provided to us following our request by the Ministry of Health 
(MoH) and this yields an additional value to the analysis: 
namely the chance to disaggregate patient inflows according 
to the typology of the selected hospital, information that is 
not available on the Ministry’s website [see, for example 
(13)]. The heterogeneity of the Italian hospital supply – by 
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a brief description. Considering the public providers, Public 
Hospital Trusts are independent public hospitals controlled by 
a General Manager who is appointed by the region. They are 
separated from the LHA with whom they contract the volume 
and typology of admissions. On the contrary, more limited 
autonomy is given to the LHA hospitals, because they are 
run directly by the LHAs. University Hospitals and IRCCSs 
(Treatment and Research Institutes) are for the most part (both 
public and private) teaching facilities or hospitals carrying on 
research activities, for which they receive extra government 
funds. The MoH considers Istituti di Ricovero e Cura a 
Carattere Scientifico (IRCCSs) as centres of excellence (22). 
Considering the organisational structure, the size (average 
number of beds in acute care), the complexity of services 
being provided and (mainly) research activities, we place 
them in the same category as University Hospitals. The private 
hospital category also includes: i) religious hospitals, almost 
all of them classified as non-profit institutions; ii) private for-
profit hospitals (namely, private clinics); iii) hospital centres 
belonging to the LHAs but temporarily managed by private 
foundations via public-private partnerships (LHAs presidia); 
and iv) private “Research Unit Hospitals”, which are hospitals 
devoted for the most part to research activities. We maintain 
this classification in our analysis on mobility flows, focusing 
on the private/public differentiation. The disaggregation of 
mobility flows according to different hospital categories helps 
us in focusing on the preferences toward the public or private 
sector, controlling for the category of hospital chosen. One 
must bear in mind that patients move from one region to 
another because of a significant gap in the perceived quality of 
care. Within a framework of incomplete information (which 
is typical of the healthcare sector), the perceived quality of 
care can be easily influenced by the supply side, especially 
when the single hospital is offered incentives for attracting 
mobility. We have reported that the regions within the sample 
provide financial incentives to private accredited hospitals in 
order to attract patient inflows; there is evidence that some 
major private hospitals in the northern regions do informally 
promote their services in southern Italy and recruit patients 
through local specialists (6). This evidence supports our 
hypothesis of a more developed entrepreneurial activity 
by private providers, who react to budget restrictions by 
attracting non-resident patients (whose admissions are paid 
extra budget).
Our suggestion is that the CBM patient preferences can 
easily be influenced when information on hospital quality is 
incomplete, and regional regulations can make the most of 
this evidence in order to obtain opportunistic advantages. 
Statistical  analysis
The analysis was performed considering the regions of origin/
destination of the CBM flows. The two factors to be controlled 
for are: i) the type of mobility (boundary versus distance 
mobility) and ii) the type of destination (when hospitals of 
excellence are preferred, we can detect a “quality search” 
mobility). According to literature, “boundary CBM” is due to 
territorial proximity and to a certain extent is to be considered 
structural; whereas “distance CBM” is more quality-oriented 
(6,11–13). The statistical investigation was carried out using 
specific parameters. The most common indicators applied 
by scholars to the analysis of CBM are the “attraction index” 
and the “escape index”. The former is the ratio between the 
cross-border admissions and total discharges within the 
region. It indicates, for each region, the percentage of external 
applications for admission (from all the other regions) over 
total annual admissions. The “escape index” of any region 
is the ratio between the number of individuals leaving their 
region of residence in order to be hospitalized elsewhere in 
Italy, and the total number (in- and outside the region) of 
resident patient admissions. It reveals the dissatisfaction 
of patients for their own region. Both parameters are good 
for measuring CBM flows across regions from a national 
perspective. However, for our own purposes, we needed to 
find a more specific indicator allowing us to analyse CBM 
flows among selected regions. Given the vector X = x1...x21 
for the 21 Italian regions and the vector Y = y1...y5 for the 
five sample regions, we built a “Regional Attraction Ability 
Index” (RAAI) which is given by the ratio of “patients coming 
from xi, (with i = 1,21 ) and admitted in yj (with j = 1,5) and 
“the total amount of passive CBM for xi”. The newly found 
parameter measures for each region xi “the percentage of 
resident patients in mobility who choose to be admitted in 
the region yj of the sample”. So, in a way, it measures the power 
of attraction of yj over xi.








With RAAIyj/xi = index of the ability of a sample region 
(yj) to attract patients from another specific region (xi); 
PCBMxi/yj = number of patients resident in region xi and 
admitted to hospitals in region yj;
Tot PCBMxi = total number of patients resident in region xi 
being admitted to hospitals in other regions (i.e. passive CBM 
of region xi).
We used the RAAI index only during the first step of the 
analysis and applied it to each region yj of the sample – namely 
Lombardy, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Lazio and Molise – in 
order to select the three boundary regions x1…x3 and the three 
distance regions x4…x6, which export the highest percentage 
of their residents to that region yj. This step is represented in 
Table 1, using Lombardy as an example4. After that we built, 
in respect of each sample region, a matrix table matching the 
flows of patients, from each previously selected region x1…
x6 with the different categories of hospitals admitting them. 
In this second step of the analysis, we applied the attraction 
index formula to each hospital category: namely we matched 
each hospital category of the region yj of destination with the 
number of patients coming from each one of the six selected 
regions x1…x6. This would give us some cross information 
between the kind of mobility (boundary and distance) and the 
kind of hospital chosen (whether public or private/excellence 
or not). The attraction index computed for each hospital 
category (Attraction Index Hospital Category) is given by 
a fraction. The numerator shows the number of patients 
coming from a selected boundary or distance region (x1…x6) 
and admitted to a selected category of hospitals (e.g. Public 
Hospital Trust); the denominator shows the yearly number of 
admissions to that specific category of hospitals. These values 
allowed us to compare boundary and distance CBM using a 
parameter which is weighted for the total number of patients 
Brenna and Spandonaro
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2015, 4(6), 363–372368
admitted to each hospital category. Thus, the number of beds 
supplied within that category should not be an issue. The 
matrix tables, set up for each sample region, provided us with 
information respectively about “boundary” and “distance” 
Table 1.  Lombardy, RAAI (acute admissions)  - year 2010
Hospital CBM - RAAI Lombardy- year 2010
Resident region No. of CBM patients 
admitted in Lombardy 
RAAI (%)
Piedmont -B- 25,384 77.4
Valle d'Aosta 705 19.9
Lombardy - 0.0
P.A. Bolzano 480 16.5
P.A. Trento 1,902 21.4
Veneto 9,404 31.6
Friuli V.G. 1,547 17.6
Liguria -B- 8,526 33.6








Puglia -D- 9,877 23.8
Basilicata 1,631 10.5
Calabria 9,604 23.0
Sicily -D- 15,257 38.9
Sardinia -D- 4,602 42.9
Total 132,958 24.8
CBM= Cross-Border Mobility; RAAI= Regional attraction ability index; B= 
Boundary; D= Distance.
Source: Elaboration of data from the MoH.



























Number of beds 
(2009)
20,904 311 2,274 4497 1,251 8,006 170 - 23,489 13,924 37,413
Attraction index 4.5% 1.1% 16.1% 25.4% 3.7% 9.7% - - 5.9% 14.8% 8.4%
Positive CBM 
acute admissions
44,486 131 22,191 41,181 1,626 23,343 - - 66,808 66,150 132,958
Attraction index 
Piedmont -Bb
0.9% 0.1% 3.3% 5.0% 0.9% 1.6% - - 1.1% 2.7% 1.6%
Attraction index 
Veneto -B
0.4% 0.1% 0.6% 1.0% 0.2% 1.2% - - 0.4% 1.0% 0.6%
Attraction index 
Emilia Romagna -B
0.8% 0.1% 1.7% 2.3% 0.2% 1.9% - - 0.9% 1.9% 1.2%
Attraction index 
Puglia -Db
0.3% 0.1% 1.6% 2.1% 0.4% 0.4% - - 0.5% 1.0% 0.6%
Attraction index 
Sicily -D
0.5% 0.1% 2.0% 2.9% 0.5% 1.0% - - 0.7% 1.6% 1.0%
Attraction index 
Sardinia -D
0.1% 0.1% 0.6% 1.0% 0.2% 0.4% - - 0.2% 0.6% 0.3%
LHA= Local Health Authoritie; CBM= Cross-Border Mobility.
a University hospitals and IRCCS.
b B= boundary regions; D= distance regions.
Source: Elaboration of data provided by the MoH.
patient choice, disaggregated by type of provider. 
Results
With reference to each region of the sample, the results show 
– as we expected – that the attraction power is on average 
higher for boundary regions. Disaggregating these figures by 
hospital category, the centres of excellence show on average 
the highest attraction indices, confirming, as literature 
suggest, that quality is a mobility driving factor for both 
boundary and distance CBM. The hypotheses suggested by 
literature on both gravity models and the presence of a quality 
driven mobility are indirectly confirmed by our analysis.
But most importantly, with reference to each region of the 
sample and every hospital category, our findings demonstrate 
an attraction index that is systematically higher for accredited 
private hospitals than for public hospitals; this applies to 
both distance/boundary choices and every hospital category. 
These results (i.e. patient inflows demonstrating a significant 
preference for private accredited hospitals) are corroborated 
by a recent study on the Italian CBM, which is restricted to 
the field of aortic valve replacement (6).
Tables 2 and 3 report the values for Lombardy and Tuscany, 
respectively. For Lombardy, the aggregated attraction index 
for the private hospital category (15.9%) compared with 
that of public providers (5.9%) indicates a greater ability of 
the private sector in intercepting the non-resident demand. 
It is interesting to observe that, although the number of 
beds of public providers (23,489) is much higher than that 
of private providers (13,924), the number of admissions in 
2010 is almost the same for the two categories (66,808 public 
versus 66,150 private). Focusing on hospitals of excellence 
(which show the highest attraction index), there is a greater 
degree of preference for private hospitals (25.4% private vs. 
16.1% public); this finding suggests the presence of possible 
strategic incentives from the supply side that influence 
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the choice of patients. In the case of the Lombardy region, 
the highest attraction index is the one for private centres 
of excellence (25.4%). The disparity between public and 
private attraction indices remains when considering each of 
the six regions (Piedmont, Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Puglia, 
Sicily and Sardinia) that contribute with a higher degree of 
patient inflows to Lombardy (columns 10 and 11 of Table 2). 
Specifically, both distance and boundary flows show a greater 
preference for private providers and, on average, the highest 
attraction indices relate to boundary CBM. This result could 
mean that the induction from private providers has a greater 
impact on boundary mobility, where patient preferences 
are not constrained by travel/accommodation expenses. 
However, this item needs to be investigated to a greater extent. 
With respect to Tuscany, results confirm an aggregated 
attraction index that is higher for the private hospital 
category (31.9%) than for the public providers one (9.1%). 
Hospitals that are centres of excellence still demonstrate very 
high attraction indices and, again, the disparity between the 
power of attraction of private and public hospitals is shown 
for each one of the x1…x6 (boundaries and distance) regions. 
Private clinics, whose presence is widespread on the territory, 
also show a very high attraction power, highlighting how 
the internal structure of each regional health system could 
influence CBM flows. As for Lombardy, attraction indices 
in the category of private providers are higher for boundary 
regions compared to distance regions on an average. 
Data on the other sample regions are reported in the 
Additional file 1 and the results are aligned with those of 
Tuscany and Lombardy. In general, with reference to all the 
sample regions, the greater power of attraction exercised by 
private hospitals with respect to public ones is confirmed 
for both boundary and distance CBM. This finding is 
corroborated by the CBM trend during the last three years of 
observation (2009–11) that shows a progressive increase in 


























Number of beds 
(2009) - 6,460 3,124 70 - 1,776 155 117 9,584 2,118 11,702
Attraction index - 4.5% 16.5% 60.8% - 32.7% - 0 9.1% 31.9% 11.1%
Positive CBM - acute 
admissions
- 15,898 35,471 1,210 - 15,301 - 800 51,369 17,311 68,680
Attraction index 
Liguria -Bb
- 1.1% 1.4% 8.1% - 7.6% - 0 1.2% 7.6% 1.8%
Attraction index 
Umbria -B
- 0.5% 1.1% 3.9% - 4.0% - 0 0.7% 3.6% 1.0%
Attraction index 
Lazio -B
- 0.7% 2.2% 2.3% - 5.8% - 0 1.3% 5.2% 1.6%
Attraction index 
Campania -Db
- 0.3% 2.8% 12.5% - 2.3% - 0 1.3% 2.5% 1.4%
Attraction index 
Sicily -D
- 0.3% 1.6% 5.3% - 2.2% - 0 0.8% 2.1% 0.9%
Attraction index 
Sardinia -D
- 0.1% 0.4% 1.9% - 0.3% - 0 0.2% 0.4% 0.2%
LHA= Local Health Authoritie; CBM= Cross-Border Mobility.
a University hospitals and IRCCS.
b B= boundary regions; D= distance regions.
Source: Elaboration of data provided by the MoH.
Figure 4. Lombardy: CBM acute admissions (ordinary and DH) by typology 
of hospital - years 2009–11. Source: Elaboration of data from the MoH.
the number of CBM patients admitted to accredited private 
hospitals for each region in the sample, with the exception of 
Molise (see Figure 4 for Lombardy). The case of Molise, the 
only southern region with a positive CBM balance (3,075 in 
2010), is enlightening. Molise is one of the smallest regions 
in Italy with 319,780 inhabitants, ten hospitals, 1,425 beds 
and 71,248 admissions in acute care over the year 2010. 
Nonetheless, one patient out of four comes from another 
region. The highest values of regional attraction ability indices 
are shown for Campania (15%), Puglia (8.1%), Abruzzi 
(8.1%) and Lazio (6.6%), which are all boundary regions. 
Molise attraction ability is almost entirely due to the presence 
of two centres of excellence: “IRCCS Neuromed”, specialised 
in neurological pathologies (with an 82.5% attraction index); 
and “Biomedical Science” Academic Research Unit, both of 
which are private facilities. This result stresses the importance 
of an accreditation policy designed to increase the quality 
of a regional health system and confirms that well-provided 
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for mobility. While some northern and central regions have 
developed their accreditation process opting for improvement 
in the quality of their regional health systems, many southern 
regions failed to do so [to this extent, see (5)], with the 
consequence that consistent flows of patients (and money) 
migrate every year from the south to those northern and 
central regions in order to obtain hospital care. Our analysis 
suggests that the infra-regional trade-off between greater 
patient choice (due to an increase in hospital services supply) 
and financial equilibrium has been solved by many regions 
(typically those showing higher CBM balance) by driving 
patient inflows. The arrangement of ad hoc contractual 
agreements between regional authorities and the accredited 
private providers category in order to favour non-resident 
patient admissions, corroborates this hypothesis [see for 
example the 2011–4 General Agreement between the Emilia 
Romagna Region and the Association of Private Accredited 
Hospitals; and, for Lombardy, Decree no. 2693/2011 and 
(29)]. When patient inflows are prevalently steered towards 
accredited private providers, this phenomenon depends upon 
the ability of the latter to induce the demand; moreover, it is 
based on incentives resulting from the contractual agreements 
between purchasers and providers of hospital care. A few 
northern and central regions might have furthered the 
accreditation of private centres of excellence, with the dual 
objective of developing high-quality regional health systems 
and exporting any excess production to other regions. 
This fact, however, exacerbates the north-south gradient in 
the Italian NHS. The presence of reliable one-way flows of 
patients leaving their own regions to seek care elsewhere is 
due to a misallocation of resources in the Italian NHS caused, 
inter alia, by the lack of centralized planning during the 
accreditation process. Federalism did not help this picture. 
The perception of the quality of care provided by a region 
depends upon the ability of that region to export net flows 
of services. Some regional health systems, such as those 
belonging to Lombardy and Emilia Romagna, reaped the 
greatest advantages from CBM. While the CBM phenomenon 
could be explained and accepted in a few cases by the 
presence of specialisations, this becomes an issue when it 
involves a one-way flow of patients accompanied by financial 
resources. This unilateral flow, as Tiebout suggests, is very 
good at representing the inefficiencies of the regional health 
systems in the south; systems that are not able to retain their 
own patients and which simultaneously pay for the fixed costs 
of their hospitals and for the migration of their patients to 
facilities in other regions. To this extent, due consideration 
should be given to equity issues related to the possibility of 
individual patient to move to another region, given high 
travel and accommodation expenses [see (6) in this respect].
Discussion 
The aim of the paper was investigating whether CBM 
patients actually prefer private accredited hospitals rather 
than public hospitals. The normative inspection of the 
rules supervising financial agreements between regional 
authorities and providers of hospital care, within the regions 
showing very high inpatient flows, suggests the presence 
of strategic incentives able to drive patient inflows towards 
private hospitals. The accreditation of private hospitals in 
some regions was carried out with the two-fold objective of 
implementing a good quality health system and contextually 
overcoming the risk of an excess production by drawing 
financial resources from CBM flows. The analysis was 
structured in three phases: i) an inspection of the institutional 
framework ruling the hospital accreditation process at a 
central level; ii) a more specific insight – within a selected 
sample of five regions – into the regional regulations 
governing contractual agreements between purchasers 
and providers of hospital care; and, finally, iii) an empirical 
investigation of CBM flows directed towards the five regions 
of the sample, in order to test for patient preferences. A 
common denominator of the five selected sample regions 
is their high positive CBM balance, while they diverge with 
respect to the inner setting of their healthcare systems. The 
latter feature has been chosen in order to detect every possible 
aspect of CBM flows due to the regional supply of hospital 
services, principally focussing on the disaggregation between 
public and private hospitals and between hospitals that are or 
are not centres of excellence. The first phase has highlighted 
the implicit contradiction of an accreditation system that, 
originally set down by the central government, has been 
formally developed at a regional level with a fair margin of 
autonomy. As suggested by literature, an increased supply of 
hospital services within a publicly financed sector – given 
fixed tariffs – inevitably clashes with the budget constraints 
determined at a regional level (3,30). To this extent, the 
internal regulations enforced by each region for planning 
the maximum amount of production and the reimbursement 
limits for hospital care providers becomes crucial. It is more 
likely that private hospitals respect production ceilings 
more strictly than public hospitals, because the latter can 
be refunded ex-post by regional authorities. In consequence 
thereof, private providers of hospital care are allowed (and 
even encouraged by contractual agreements) to make up for 
their excess production through CBM flows. Our regulatory 
assessment of the contractual agreements between purchaser 
and providers of hospital care shows that it is only in respect 
of private providers that CBM admissions are excluded from 
the production limits set on a yearly basis and are paid extra-
budget at the end of the year. This is true for all the regions 
of the sample, except for the small-sized Molise region, where 
the geographical location and the presence of two high-
quality accredited private hospitals suggests that CBM in this 
region is guaranteed without the need for regulatory-type 
incentives. The empirical inspection confirms our findings 
and demonstrates that the attraction indices of private 
providers of hospital care – disaggregated by homogeneous 
categories – are higher compared to those of public providers. 
As a further finding, in four regions out of five there is 
evidence of higher weighted flows of CBM towards facilities 
of excellence (IRCCS and University Hospitals) compared to 
the other providers; suggesting that these facilities represent 
an attraction pole for non-resident patients. Still, a higher 
preference for the private sector is detected within this 
category.
Concluding remarks and policy proposals
Inter-regional mobility for hospital care is becoming a 
predominant issue for resource reallocation among regions. 
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Our analysis shows a considerable constant flow of patients 
(and money) moving from the south of Italy (especially 
from Calabria, Campania, Puglia and Sicily) towards 
selected regions in central and northern Italy, where more 
effective and entrepreneurial providers may take advantage 
of this migration in order to increase their business. This 
phenomenon raises concerns at both a micro and a macro 
level. At a micro level, patients migrate when the perceived 
quality of care in another region offsets the costs of migrating; 
but given the high costs of moving to a distant region, free 
choice is actually limited by the resources available to the 
patient and this point raises equity issues (31). At a macro 
level, besides the denied right of equal access to equal care 
(which is a basic principle of the Italian NHS), there is an 
annual flow of resources going from the southern to the 
central/northern areas of the country. To this extent, regions 
experiencing high patients outflows pay for both hospital 
treatments supplied to their outgoing patients and fixed costs 
of their public hospitals, which suffer from a low demand for 
admissions. This gives rise to a dual policy proposal. Firstly, 
as far as southern Italy is concerned, new investments in 
personnel, advanced technology and specialization within 
the hospital sector would help contain patient outflows – as 
suggested by the Molise experience. Contextually, southern 
regions and regions where patient inflows broadly converge 
should enter into inter-regional agreements that are likely 
to provide the former with a tool for planning the number, 
typology and financial coverage of outgoing admissions. 
These types of agreement have been implemented in recent 
years by boundary regions in northern Italy and have 
succeeded in decreasing inappropriateness and in controlling 
CBM flows. 
The last consideration regards cross-border European 
mobility, recently reformed by EU directive 24/2011. Despite 
the significant differences between national and international 
mobility across Member States, the current lack of multilateral 
agreements modulating patient outflows among European 
States recalls the absence of cross-regional reciprocity 
agreements between southern and northern Italian regions 
and suggests possible scenarios at the EU scale, with an 
abundance of patients and money moving from the poorer to 
the wealthier regions of the EU.
Acknowledgments 
The authors wish to thank the editors and three anonymous 
referees for their helpful comments.
Ethical issues
Ethics approval is not required for this paper, since we did not collect data 
with personal information. Data are provided from the Italian Ministry of 
Health (MoH), on our request. The paper is the result of a research carried on 
independently by the two authors. No payment has been received  from a third 
party (government, commercial, private foundation, etc.) for any aspect of the 
submitted work. No plagiarism and no conflict of interest can be addressed to 
this research.
Competing interests 
The authors declare that they have no competing interests. 
Authors’ contributions 
Both authors contributed equally to the production of this manuscript.
Authors’ affiliations
1Department of Economics and Finance, Università Cattolica del S. Cuore, 
Milano, Italy. 2Department of Economics, Law and Institutions, Università Tor 
Vergata, Roma, Italy.
Endnotes
1. In some cases even the gap - if positive - between the DRG tariff applied 
for resident patients’ admissions and the national tariff (TUC, see below in the 
text) used to refund hospital treatments for patients in mobility, can represent an 
incentive to attract patients’ inflows. See for example (6).
2. Not all the fixed costs are presently covered by the DRG tariff. For example, 
the Central Government occasionally approves extra funds for the building.
3. Molise is a very small region located in the south of Italy which has been 
provided with two centers of excellence and therefore receives inpatients flows 
from bordering regions without the need of implementing specific rules in the 
contractual agreements with private providers. 
4. See the Additional file 1 for the other regions.
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